To what extent does perceptual language reflect universals of experience and cognition, and to what extent is it shaped by particular cultural preoccupations? This paper investigates the universality~relativity of perceptual language by examining the use of basic perception terms in spontaneous conversation across 13 diverse languages and cultures. We analyze the frequency of perception words to test two universalist hypotheses: that sight is always a dominant sense, and that the relative ranking of the senses will be the same across different (...) cultures. We find that references to sight outstrip references to the other senses, suggesting a pan-human preoccupation with visual phenomena. However, the relative frequency of the other senses was found to vary cross-linguistically. Cultural relativity was conspicuous as exemplified by the high ranking of smell in Semai, an Aslian language. Together these results suggest a place for both universal constraints and cultural shaping of the language of perception. (shrink)

A theory T is tight if different deductively closed extensions of T (in the same language) cannot be bi-interpretable. Many well-studied foundational theories are tight, including $\mathsf {PA}$ [39], $\mathsf {ZF}$, $\mathsf {Z}_2$, and $\mathsf {KM}$ [6]. In this article we extend Enayat’s investigations to subsystems of these latter two theories. We prove that restricting the Comprehension schema of $\mathsf {Z}_2$ and $\mathsf {KM}$ gives non-tight theories. Specifically, we show that $\mathsf {GB}$ and $\mathsf {ACA}_0$ each admit different bi-interpretable extensions, (...) and the same holds for their extensions by adding $\Sigma ^1_k$ -Comprehension, for $k \ge 1$. These results provide evidence that tightness characterizes $\mathsf {Z}_2$ and $\mathsf {KM}$ in a minimal way. (shrink)

Fundamentación: la educación integral del estudiante de Medicina incluye el desarrollo de las habilidades comunicativas y lingüísticas en idioma Inglés, que le posibiliten mantenerse informado y comunicarse en medios anglófonos. La prensa escrita es un medio de información que permite que los estudiantes reflexionen, valoren, interpreten y se comuniquen. Objetivo: Contribuir al desarrollo de las habilidades lingüísticas y comunicativas con la prensa escrita en clases de inglés. Método: Se realizó un estudio pre-experimental que consistió en elaborar ejercicios a partir de (...) la utilización de artículos de la prensa escrita relacionados con medicina y salud pública, como medios de enseñanza. El estudio se realizó con 40 estudiantes del quinto año de Medicina y 15 profesionales matriculados en un curso de posgrado de la Facultad de Ciencias Médicas de Mayabeque. Resultados: La información sobre aspectos de medicina y salud pública publicados en la prensa y los hábitos de lectura de la prensa de los estudiantes del quinto año era baja antes de la intervención y después de la puesta en práctica de la experiencia mejoró significativamente. Los resultados de los cuatro cortes evaluativos muestran la eficacia de la experiencia, por cuanto el desarrollo de las habilidades se comportó de manera ascendente. Conclusiones: Este sistema de trabajo facilitó la motivación de las clases, se desarrollaron habilidades lingüísticas y comunicativas y sirvió de base para fomentar el trabajo educativo, aumentó el vocabulario general y técnico de los estudiantes. Foundation: the medical students’ integral education includes the development of linguistic and communicative abilities in the English language, in such a way, they have the possibility to be informed and communicate properly in English-speaking contexts. The printing press is a means of information which allows them to reflect, valuate interpretate and communicate properly. Objective: to contribute to the development of linguistic and communicative abilities with the printing press in the English lessons Method: it was carried out a pre-experimental study which consisted in the elaboration of exercises related to the content of medical articles taken from the printing press. The study was carried out with 40 5th year medical students and 15 health professionals registered for a post graduated course of English in the Faculty of medicine from Mayabeque. Results: the information concerning medicine and public health published in the printing press and the 5th year medical students reading habits before putting into practice the didactic experience were low. Meanwhile, it improved considerably after its implementation. The results of the four evaluative breaks show the effectiveness of the didactic experience. The development of reading abilities was increased. Conclusions: this system of work facilitated motivation during the learning activities, linguistic and communicative abilities were developed considerably; it served as a base to promote educative work, and to increase the students general and technical vocabulary. (shrink)

Being a person, unlike being just an individual, Deutsch argues, represents an achievement and not just a "given." A person "is a dynamic integration of the particular conditions and universal features of his individual being... in a manner that... is appropriate for himself". This articulation takes the form of "masking," the creation of a mask that fits properly and which allows for self-expression. If the mask is too tight the person and his appearance are coextensive; if it is too loose (...) appearances hide the individual's inner self. A mask that fits properly, on the other hand, reveals a person who is "right for himself," one whom we are therefore inclined to trust, and who is free, for freedom is a quality of achieved personhood. A person, furthermore, is characterized by an autonomy and a self-confidence which can recognize the "other" as a person also. (shrink)

La réception de la théologie politique de Johann Baptist Metz est un fait d’interprétation. Cette contribution présente tout d’abord la périodisation, apparue dans les années 1980, de l’oeuvre de Metz en trois phases: la période de la théologie transcendantale; la première phase de la théologie politique ainsi que sa deuxième phase. Décrire deux phases de la théologie politique délimitées par la formulation de la thèse centrale de l’oeuvre de Metz, selon laquelle la foi est mémoire de la souffrance de l’humanité, (...) permet de mettre en lumière la signification et les enjeux de la théologie politique. La deuxième partie de l’article s’intéresse à un aspect encore sujet à discussions de la réception de l’oeuvre de Metz: en réponse au refus postmoderne des grands récits, Metz et ses disciples présentent la théologie politique comme une théologie négative. Cependant, une telle réponse peut-elle être séparée d’autres affirmations déterminantes pour la théologie politique, en particulier celle selon laquelle le temps a une fin? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:An Introduction to Mādhva VedāntaRobert ZydenbosAn Introduction to Mādhva Vedānta. By Deepak Sarma. Ashgate World Philosophies Series. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003. Pp. xiii + 159. Paper.The school of Vedānta philosophy founded by Madhva (1238-1317 C.E.) is popularly known as Dvaita, a name Madhva himself never used and which is somewhat misleading, as it suggests a dualism while Madhva's philosophy is rather a pluralistic one. The adjective Mādhva, derived from (...) Madhva's name, is used to designate the followers of Madhva's Vaiṣṇava variety of brahminical Hinduism, and may be used to unambiguously identify this kind of Vedānta. Although this school plays an important role in the history of Indian thought, it has been sadly neglected by modern Vedānta scholarship, which tends to focus on Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita. The first serious modern study, written in German by Helmut von Glasenapp, was Madhva's Philosophie des Vishnu-Glaubens (Bonn, 1923), of which the English translation by S. Shrothri, Madhva's Philosophy of the Vishnu Faith (Bangalore, 1992), is not beautiful but has the merit that a few minor errors in von Glasenapp's pioneer work have been corrected in footnotes. In the well-known histories of Indian philosophy, Surendranath Dasgupta's treatment of Madhva (A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 4) is considerably better than the rather scanty one by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (Indian Philosophy, vol. 2, chap. 10, sections 6-14).The amount of Sanskrit writing in the tradition of Madhva is considerable, and in this still very living tradition there is a huge production of literature in modern Indian languages, almost all of it in Kannada, the tradition having originated and still having its stronghold in what today is the Kannada-speaking state of Karnataka in southern India (Madhva was a native speaker of Tulu, a language spoken in southwestern Karnataka, which has hardly any written literature). Among modern authors writing in English, the best known is B.N.K. Sharma (The Philosophy of Śrī Madhvācārya: A History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature), most of whose writings unfortunately suffer from a polemically sectarian outlook. As a general historical and systematic introduction to Madhva, his works, and his thought, the French La doctrine de Madhva by Suzanne Siauve (Pondichéry, 1968) remains unsurpassed. More recently, the most important studies of Madhva's works that appeared outside India are again in German, by Roque Mesquita: Madhva und seine unbekannten literarischen Quellen (Vienna, 1997; now also available in an English translation as Madhva's Unknown Literary Sources: Some Observations. New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan, 2000) and his superb translation and study of one of Madhva's most important works, Madhva: Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya (Vienna, 2000).Madhva's doctrine is considered one of the three main currents in Vedānta, next to Viśiṣṭādvaita-Vedānta (the monistic doctrine formulated by Rāmānuja) and the variety that is best known in the Western world, Advaita-Vedānta (the illusionistic [End Page 665] monism that received its classical form at the hands of Śankara). According to the hagiography, Madhva grew up in an Advaitin environment but came to consider the Advaitins his main philosophical opponents, because monism, and particularly one that essentially denied the reality of the phenomenal world, did not support his Vaiṣṇava (recognizing Viṣṇu as the supreme being) devotional religiosity. He therefore sought to establish a pluralistic philosophy that did not dismiss phenomenal reality as illusory.Dvaita- or Mādhva-Vedānta is actually much more than the exegesis, sometimes rather imaginative, of the standard set of mainstream brahminical texts that one would expect from Vedānta. Madhva was a creative thinker, and his doctrine is an intellectual tour de force that seeks to combine elements from several sources and currents of religious and philosophical thought into one coherent whole: a philosophical terminology from Vedānta; ritualism from the Pāñcarātra āgamas; mythology from the Vedas, Upanishads, the great epics, and the purāṇas (Madhva wrote an extensive commentary on the Bhāgavatapurāṇa); and an ontology and epistemology that reveal the influence of Jainism.It... (shrink)

Two essays on utilitarianism, written from opposite points of view, by J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams. In the first part of the book Professor Smart advocates a modern and sophisticated version of classical utilitarianism; he tries to formulate a consistent and persuasive elaboration of the doctrine that the rightness and wrongness of actions is determined solely by their consequences, and in particular their consequences for the sum total of human happiness. In Part II Bernard Williams offers a sustained (...) and vigorous critique of utilitarian assumptions, arguments and ideals. He finds inadequate the theory of action implied by utilitarianism, and he argues that utilitarianism fails to engage at a serious level with the real problems of moral and political philosophy, and fails to make sense of notions such as integrity, or even human happiness itself. This book should be of interest to welfare economists, political scientists and decision-theorists. (shrink)

CADERNOS DE FILOSOFIA EXTRAVAGANTE - ANTÓNIO TELMO Vários Autores Um dos sinais do Quinto Império é que ainda há andorinhas O provérbio diz que uma andorinha não faz a Primavera Mas eu acho que faz Enquanto houver um homem onde resida a espiritualidade há sempre um princípio do Quinto Império António Telmo Este terceiro volume dos Cadernos de Filosofia Extravagante é o primeiro que se publica após a partida de António Telmo, que os imaginou, concebeu e fundou Constitui por isso, (...) na íntegra, um preito de homenagem ao autor da História Secreta de Portugal, nele se inserindo, bem a propósito, as actas do Colóquio A Obra e o Pensamento de António Telmo, realizado em 14 e 15 de Fevereiro de 2011, no Palácio da Independência, em Lisboa, por iniciativa do Instituto de Filosofia Luso-Brasileira, documento a que acrescem alguns testemunhos de amigos que, por uma ou outra razão, não puderam participar naquela comemoração, e duas entrevistas, uma das quais se encontrava por publicar, pelo filósofo concedidas na última década Por outro lado, nestas páginas o leitor poderá ainda encontrar dois escritos do autor de O Bateleur – um poema e um conto – nunca antes dados ao papel em letra de forma E, o que talvez seja mais, uma série significativa de correspondência epistolar até agora mantida inédita, tendo o filósofo por destinatário São missivas de Álvaro Ribeiro, José Marinho, Agostinho da Silva, Dalila Pereira da Costa e António Quadros, definindo um arco temporal que vai da publicação de Arte Poética, em 1963, à de Filosofia e Kabbalah, em 1990 Quase trinta anos de uma vida filosófica singular em que, a cada passo, são bem notórias a admiração e a amizade que mestres e condiscípulos lhe dedicam Autores- António Telmo, Pedro Martins, Renato Epifânio, Américo Rodrigues, Helena Estriga, António Braz Teixeira, Joaquim Domingues, Abel de Lacerda Botelho, Roque N Brás de Oliveira, M N Vieira, Luís Paixão, António Carlos Carvalho, Cynthia Guimarães Taveira, Rui Lopo, António Quadros Ferro, Carlos Aurélio, António Cândido Franco, Rodrigo Sobral Cunha, Carlos Vargas, Manuel Ferreira Patrício, Pedro Sinde, Paulo Santos, Pedro Paquim Ribeiro, Maurícia Teles da Silva, J Pinharanda Gomes, António Quadros, Avelino de Sousa, Elísio Gala, José Paulo Ribeiro Albuquerque, Helder Cortes, Eduardo Aroso, Isabel Xavier, Jesus Carlos, Álvaro Ribeiro, José Marinho, Agostinho da Silva, Dalila Pereira da Costa. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Rima Basu and I have offered separate accounts of wokeness as an anti-racist ethical concept. Our accounts endorse controversial doctrines in epistemology: doxastic wronging, doxastic voluntarism, and moral encroachment. Many philosophers deny these three views, favoring instead some ordinary standards for epistemic justification. I call this denial the standard view. In this paper, I offer an account of wokeness that is consistent with the standard view. I argue that wokeness is best understood as ‘group epistemic partiality’. The woke person (...) does extra epistemic work before forming a negative belief about a member of an oppressed social group. Just as we do extra epistemic work when forming belief about our friends, so the woke person does for members of oppressed social groups. I first outline the account. I then raise questions about the scope of wokeness and belief formation. After this, I demonstrate that the group partiality view is consistent with the standard view in epistemology. The partiality view, therefore, should appeal to epistemologists who have adopted the standard view because it is consistent with ordinary standards of justification. I conclude that wokeness as a concept in epistemology should not be controversial for those who endorse the standard view. (shrink)

The role of causation and counterfactuals in causal decision theory is vexed and disputed. Recently, Brian Hedden (2023) argues that we should abandon causal decision theory in favour of an alternative: counterfactual decision theory. I argue that, pace Hedden, counterfactual decision theory is not a competitor to, but rather a version of, causal decision theory – the most popular version by far. I provide textual evidence that the founding fathers of causal decision theory (Stalnaker, Gibbard, Harper, Lewis, Skyrms, Sobel, and (...) Joyce) all endorse counterfactual decision theories. I additionally discuss why these theories came to be called ‘causal’, rather than ‘counterfactual’. And I argue that, properly understood, causal decision theory escapes Hedden's objections. (shrink)

Abstract: Might knowledge normatively govern conversations and not just their discrete constituent thoughts and (assertoric) actions? I answer yes, at least for a restricted class of conversations I call aimed conversations. On the view defended here, aimed conversations are governed by participatory know-how - viz., knowledge how to do what each interlocutor to the conversation shares a participatory intention to do by means of that conversation. In the specific case of conversations that are in the service of joint inquiry, the (...) view defended is that interlocutors (A, B, ... n) must intentionally inquire together into whether p, by means of an aimed conversation X, only if A,B, ... n know how to use X to find out together whether p. The view is supported by considerations about instrumental rationality, shared intentionality, the epistemology of intentional action, as well as linguistic data. (shrink)

In their thought-provoking article, Sedlakova and Trachsel (2023) defend the view that the status—both epistemic and ethical—of Conversational Artificial Intelligence (CAI) used in psychotherapy is complicated. While therapeutic CAI seems to be more than a mere tool implementing particular therapeutic techniques, it falls short of being a “digital therapist.” One of the main arguments supporting the latter claim is that even though “the interaction with CAI happens in the course of conversation… the conversation is profoundly different from a conversation with (...) a human therapist” (Sedlakova and Trachsel 2023, 8). In particular, unlike a human therapist, CAI cannot help its users gain new insight and self-understanding (Sedlakova and Trachsel 2023). We agree that currently available therapeutic CAI cannot be considered a “digital therapist,” however, we think that the issue surrounding the acquisition of new self-understanding in the interaction with therapeutic CAI is more complicated than Sedlakova and Trachsel suggest. (shrink)

This dialogue turns into a discussion between three people. The interlocutors are Socrates, Jeito and finally also Plato. The dimensions of Time, Space and Person are occasionally transgressed. The conclusion is that information seems to be unidirectional concerning life and death.

Growing demand for broadly accessible mental health care, together with the rapid development of new technologies, trigger discussions about the feasibility of psychotherapeutic interventions based on interactions with Conversational Artificial Intelligence (CAI). Many authors argue that while currently available CAI can be a useful supplement for human-delivered psychotherapy, it is not yet capable of delivering fully fledged psychotherapy on its own. The goal of this paper is to investigate what are the most important obstacles on our way to developing CAI (...) systems capable of delivering psychotherapy in the future. To this end, we formulate and discuss three challenges central to this quest. Firstly, we might not be able to develop effective AI-based psychotherapy unless we deepen our understanding of what makes human-delivered psychotherapy effective. Secondly, assuming that it requires building a therapeutic relationship, it is not clear whether psychotherapy can be delivered by non-human agents. Thirdly, conducting psychotherapy might be a problem too complicated for narrow AI, i.e., AI proficient in dealing with only relatively simple and well-delineated tasks. If this is the case, we should not expect CAI to be capable of delivering fully-fledged psychotherapy until the so-called “general” or “human-like” AI is developed. While we believe that all these challenges can ultimately be overcome, we think that being mindful of them is crucial to ensure well-balanced and steady progress on our path to AI-based psychotherapy. (shrink)

Built in the centre of Copenhagen, and noted for its equestrian stairway, the Rundetaarn, was intended as an astronomical observatory. Part of a complex of buildings that once included a university library, it affords expansive views of the city in every direction, towering above what surrounds it. The metaphor of the towering figure, who sees what others might not, whose vantage point allows him to visualize how things fit together, and who has an earned-stature of respect and authority, fits another (...) Danish stalwart, Hans Vilhelm Hansen, whose contributions to the fields of informal logic and argument theory have earned the gratitude of his colleagues, and inspired this collection of essays, written to express the appreciation of its authors and of the many, many colleagues they represent. (shrink)

According to the cognitive model of psychopathology, maladaptive beliefs about oneself, others, and the world are the main factors contributing to the development and persistence of various forms of mental suffering. Therefore, the key therapeutic process of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT)—a therapeutic approach rooted in the cognitive model—is cognitive restructuring, i.e., a process of revision of such maladaptive beliefs. In this paper, I examine the philosophical assumptions underlying CBT and offer theoretical reasons to think that the effectiveness of belief revision (...) in psychotherapy is very limited. This is the case, I argue, because the cognitive model wrongly assumes that our body of beliefs is unified, while it is in fact fragmented. (shrink)

Intentional action is, in some sense, non-accidental, and one common way action theorists have attempted to explain this is with reference to control. The idea, in short, is that intentional action implicates control, and control precludes accidentality. But in virtue of what, exactly, would exercising control over an action suffice to make it non-accidental in whatever sense is required for the action to be intentional? One interesting and prima facie plausible idea that we wish to explore in this paper is (...) that control is non-accidental in virtue of requiring knowledge—either knowledge-that or knowledge-how (e.g., Beddor and Pavese 2021; cf., Setiya 2008; 2012 and Habgood-Coote 2018). We review in detail some key recent work defending such knowledge-centric theories of control, and we show that none of these accounts holds water. We conclude with some discussion about how control opposes the sort of luck intentional action excludes without doing so by requiring knowledge (that- or how). (shrink)

The majority of our linguistic exchanges, such as everyday conversations, are divided into turns; one party usually talks at a time, with only relatively rare occurrences of brief overlaps in which there are two simultaneous speakers. Moreover, conversational turn-taking tends to be very fast. We typically start producing our responses before the previous turn has finished, i.e., before we are confronted with the full content of our interlocutor’s utterance. This raises interesting questions about the nature of linguistic understanding. Philosophical theories (...) typically focus on linguistic understanding characterized either as an ability to grasp the contents of utterances in a given language or as outputs of this ability—mental states of one type or another. In this paper, I supplement these theories by developing an account of the process of understanding. I argue that it enables us to capture the dynamic and temporal aspect of understanding and reconcile philosophical investigations with empirical research on language comprehension. (shrink)

The language of “participant-driven research,” “crowdsourcing” and “citizen science” is increasingly being used to encourage the public to become involved in research ventures as both subjects and scientists. Originally, these labels were invoked by volunteer research efforts propelled by amateurs outside of traditional research institutions and aimed at appealing to those looking for more “democratic,” “patient-centric,” or “lay” alternatives to the professional science establishment. As mainstream translational biomedical research requires increasingly larger participant pools, however, corporate, academic and governmental research programs (...) are embracing this populist rhetoric to encourage wider public participation. We examine the ethical and social implications of this recruitment strategy. We begin by surveying examples of “citizen science” outside of biomedicine, as paradigmatic of the aspirations this democratizing rhetoric was originally meant to embody. Next, we discuss the ways these aspirations become articulated in the biomedical context, with a view to drawing out the multiple and potentially conflicting meanings of “public engagement” when citizens are also the subjects of the science. We then illustrate two uses of public engagement rhetoric to gain public support for national biomedical research efforts: its post-hoc use in the “care.data” project of the National Health Service in England, and its proactive uses in the “Precision Medicine Initiative” of the United States White House. These examples will serve as the basis for a normative analysis, discussing the potential ethical and social ramifications of this rhetoric. We pay particular attention to the implications of government strategies that cultivate the idea that members of the public have a civic duty to participate in government-sponsored research initiatives. We argue that such initiatives should draw from policy frameworks that support normative analysis of the role of citizenry. And, we conclude it is imperative to make visible and clear the full spectrum of meanings of “citizen science,” the contexts in which it is used, and its demands with respect to participation, engagement, and governance. (shrink)

Conversational Artificial Intelligence (CAI) systems (also known as AI “chatbots”) are among the most promising examples of the use of technology in mental health care. With already millions of users worldwide, CAI is likely to change the landscape of psychological help. Most researchers agree that existing CAIs are not “digital therapists” and using them is not a substitute for psychotherapy delivered by a human. But if they are not therapists, what are they, and what role can they play in mental (...) health care? To answer these questions, we appeal to two well-established and widely discussed concepts: cognitive and affective artifacts. Cognitive artifacts are artificial devices contributing functionally to the performance of a cognitive task. Affective artifacts are objects which have the capacity to alter subjects’ affective state. We argue that therapeutic CAIs are a kind of cognitive-affective artifacts which contribute to positive therapeutic change by (i) simulating a (quasi-)therapeutic interaction, (ii) supporting the performance of cognitive tasks, and (iii) altering the affective condition of their users. This sheds new light on why virtually all existing mental health CAIs implement principles and techniques of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy — a therapeutic orientation according to which affective change and, ultimately, positive therapeutic change is mediated by cognitive change. Simultaneously, it allows us to conceptualize better the potential and limitations of applying these technologies in therapy. (shrink)

It is often suggested that we are equipped with a set of cognitive tools that help us to filter out unreliable testimony. But are these tools effective? I answer this question in two steps. Firstly, I argue that they are not real-time effective. The process of filtering, which takes place simultaneously with or right after language comprehension, does not prevent a particular hearer on a particular occasion from forming beliefs based on false testimony. Secondly, I argue that they are long-term (...) effective. Some hearers sometimes detect false testimony, which increases speakers’ incentives for honesty and stabilizes the practice of human communication in which deception is risky and costly. In short, filtering prevents us from forming a large number of beliefs based on false testimony, not by turning each of us into a high-functioning polygraph but by turning the social environment of human communication into one in which such polygraphs are not required. Finally, I argue that these considerations support strong anti-reductionism about testimonial entitlement. (shrink)

Knowledge, like other things of value, can be faked. According to Hawley (2011), know-how is harder to fake than knowledge-that, given that merely apparent propositional knowledge is in general more resilient to our attempts at successful detection than are corresponding attempts to fake know-how. While Hawley’s reasoning for a kind of detection resilience asymmetry between know-how and know-that looks initially plausible, it should ultimately be resisted. In showing why, we outline different ways in which know-how can be faked even when (...) a given performance is successful; and in doing so, we distinguish how know-how can be faked (no less than know-that) via upstream and downstream indicators of its presence, and within each of these categories, we’ll distinguish (in connection with detection resilience) both faking symptoms and (various kinds of) criteria. The unappreciated resilience of faked knowledge-how to successful detection highlights a largely overlooked dimension of social-epistemic risk – risk we face not just in our capacity as recipients of testimony, but in our capacity as both (would-be) apprentices and clients of knowledge-how. (shrink)

This study’s objective was to understand Colombian adolescents’ experiences and preferences regarding access to sexual and reproductive health services (SRHS), either alone or accompanied. A mixed-method approach was used, involving a survey of 812 participants aged eleven to twenty-four years old and forty-five semi-structured interviews with participants aged fourteen to twenty-three. Previous research shows that adolescents prefer privacy when accessing SRHS and often do not want their parents involved. Such findings align with the longstanding tendency to frame the ethical principle (...) of autonomy as based on independence in decision-making. However, the present study shows that such a conceptualization and application of autonomy does not adequately explain Colombian adolescent participants’ preferences regarding access to SRHS. Participants shared a variety of preferences to access SRHS, with the majority of participants attaching great importance to having their parents involved, to varying degrees. What emerges is a more complex and non-homogenous conceptualization of autonomy that is not inherently grounded in independence from parental involvement in access to care. We thus argue that when developing policies involving adolescents, policymakers and health professionals should adopt a nuanced “relational autonomy” approach to better respect the myriad of preferences that Colombian (and other) adolescents may have regarding their access to SRHS. (shrink)

A common objection to Sosa’s epistemology is that it countenances, in an objectionable way, unsafe knowledge. This objection, under closer inspection, turns out to be in far worse shape than Sosa’s critics have realised. Sosa and his defenders have offered two central response types to the idea that allowing unsafe knowledge is problematic: one response type adverts to the animal/reflective knowledge distinction that is characteristic of bi-level virtue epistemology. The other less-discussed response type appeals to the threat of dream scepticism, (...) and in particular, to the idea that many of our everyday perceptual beliefs are unsafe through the nearness of the dream possibility. The latter dreaming response to the safety objection to Sosa’s virtue epistemology has largely flown under the radar in contemporary discussions of safety and knowledge. We think that, suitably articulated in view of research in the philosophy and science of dreaming, it has much more going for it than has been appreciated. This paper further develops, beyond what Sosa does himself, the dreaming argument in response to those who think safety (as traditionally understood) is a condition on knowledge and who object to Sosa’s account on the grounds that it fails this condition. The payoffs of further developing this argument will be not only a better understanding of the importance of insights about dreaming against safety as a condition on knowledge, but also some reason to think a weaker safety condition, one that is relativised to SSS (i.e., skill/shape/situation) conditions for competence exercise, gets better results all things considered as an anti-luck codicil on knowledge. (shrink)

The thesis of instrumental convergence holds that a wide range of ends have common means: for instance, self preservation, desire preservation, self improvement, and resource acquisition. Bostrom contends that instrumental convergence gives us reason to think that "the default outcome of the creation of machine superintelligence is existential catastrophe". I use the tools of decision theory to investigate whether this thesis is true. I find that, even if intrinsic desires are randomly selected, instrumental rationality induces biases towards certain kinds of (...) choices. Firstly, a bias towards choices which leave less up to chance. Secondly, a bias towards desire preservation, in line with Bostrom's conjecture. And thirdly, a bias towards choices which afford more choices later on. I do not find biases towards any other of the convergent instrumental means on Bostrom's list. I conclude that the biases induced by instrumental rationality at best weakly support Bostrom's conclusion that machine superintelligence is likely to lead to existential catastrophe. (shrink)

Artificial Neural Networks have reached “grandmaster” and even “super-human” performance across a variety of games, from those involving perfect information, such as Go, to those involving imperfect information, such as “Starcraft”. Such technological developments from artificial intelligence (AI) labs have ushered concomitant applications across the world of business, where an “AI” brand-tag is quickly becoming ubiquitous. A corollary of such widespread commercial deployment is that when AI gets things wrong—an autonomous vehicle crashes, a chatbot exhibits “racist” behavior, automated credit-scoring processes (...) “discriminate” on gender, etc.—there are often significant financial, legal, and brand consequences, and the incident becomes major news. As Judea Pearl sees it, the underlying reason for such mistakes is that “... all the impressive achievements of deep learning amount to just curve fitting.” The key, as Pearl suggests, is to replace “reasoning by association” with “causal reasoning” —the ability to infer causes from observed phenomena. It is a point that was echoed by Gary Marcus and Ernest Davis in a recent piece for theNew York Times: “we need to stop building computer systems that merely get better and better at detecting statistical patterns in data sets—often using an approach known as ‘Deep Learning’—and start building computer systems that from the moment of their assembly innately grasp three basic concepts: time, space, and causality.” In this paper, foregrounding what in 1949 Gilbert Ryle termed “a category mistake”, I will offer an alternative explanation for AI errors; it is not so much that AI machinery cannot “grasp” causality, but that AI machinery (qua computation) cannot understand anything at all. (shrink)

Comparative environmental philosophy is valuable in many ways. Perhaps it is most valuable because it reveals some of the foundational assumptions that run so deep in the poles of comparison that they might otherwise have gone unnoticed. These revelations may invite us to challenge those assumptions that have led to the kind of thinking responsible for much of the environmental degradation that we see today. Japanese Environmental Philosophy gathers papers focused on the environmental problems of the twenty-first century. Drawing from (...) Japanese philosophical traditions they investigate our relationships with other humans, nonhuman animals, and the environment. The heart of the book consists of chapters written by fifteen top scholars from Japan, the United States, Europe, and Australia. The essays cover a broad range of topics drawn from various strains of Japanese thought—including Zen Buddhism, Shintoism, the Kyoto school, and Japanese philosophy of art and aesthetics—as well as from traditional Japanese culture and the contemporary science of planning for natural disasters. These articles demonstrate that Japanese scientific, philosophical, religious, and cultural traditions can provide meaningful insight to address the current global environmental crisis. (shrink)

This paper explores how adaptive creativity is continuously generated and sustained in living systems. The philosophical frame and motivations for this investigation will be introduced by juxtaposing an actual creative process with current cybernetic efforts to automate creativity. Past and present process philosophers that have critiqued the implicit commitments of these contemporary techniques will set the stage for further investigations. The litmus test of progress in this investigation will be measured against the extension of two concepts: virtuality, as introduced by (...) Gilbert Simondon (On the Mode of the Existence of Technical Objects), and relevant noise, as introduced by Bacigalupi (“Semiogenesis: A Dynamic System Approach to Agency and Structure”). To refine the concepts of virtuality and relevant noise for our purposes, a rigorous theoretical model will be proposed whose intent is to explain veritable unbounded creativity. This model will then serve as a heuristic lens to explore additional extant models, such as the Kuramoto model (Strogatz), that are used to explain empirical observations of adaptive and creative behaviors in a diversity of biological phenomena. Based on these models of biological creativity and the critique of the contemporary cybernetic project, this paper will conclude by outlining the ethical implications of our culture’s current commitments to a cybernetic world view and how we might evolve beyond it. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Purpose To quantify how often physical therapists from high-income countries (HIC) travelling to low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) practise outside their scope of practice, in what circumstances, and their likelihood of doing the same in the future. Methods An exploratory descriptive study using a survey. Results One hundred and twenty-six licensed physical therapists from around the world participated. Physical therapists typically spent less than a month (73.8 per cent) in LMIC; 67.5 per cent believed that physical therapists practise outside of (...) their scope, and 31.7 per cent reported doing so. Reasons were believing that something is better than nothing (47.5 per cent ), a mismatch between the physical therapist’s and host’s expectations (40.0 per cent ), and preserving their relationship with the host (25.0 per cent ). It was deemed appropriate by 64.5 per cent to practise outside of their scope in some situations and 53.8% considered repeating the activity in the future. Half of the respondent’s first experience in LMIC occurred as a student or in their first decade of practice. Conclusions Working in LMIC requires a keen understanding of the risks and challenges associated with such experiences. To ensure best practice, a skill set that consists of critical self-reflection, systems thinking, and structural competency combined with clinical competency and accountability is imperative. (shrink)

Orthodox causal decision theory is unstable. Its advice changes as you make up your mind about what you will do. Several have objected to this kind of instability and explored stable alternatives. Here, I'll show that explorers in search of stability must part with a vestige of their homeland. There is no plausible stable decision theory which satisfies Savage's Sure Thing Principle. So those in search of stability must learn to live without it.

In Not God Enough, J.D. Greear explains that the thing between you and the vibrant faith you want isn't answers to all our spiritual questions, but an escape from the small God we've imagined in place of an actual encounter with the real, awesome, glorious God of the Bible.